

Part 2 – Studies

Logic in a Religious Context: Dharmakīrti in Defence of *āgama*¹

1. INTRODUCTION

Contrary to what many have believed, Dharmakīrti's (~550)² view of scripture (*āgama*)³ is unambiguous and clear.⁴ In sharp contrast to Vasubandhu, who, in accordance with the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and other earlier Yogācāra texts, accepted three means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), namely, perception, inference, and – as the third – either the Buddha or the Sons of Buddha or their teaching,⁵ and also in contrast to Dignāga, who accepted scripture as a means of valid cognition but subsumed it under inference, Dharmakīrti neither counts scripture as a separate means of valid cognition nor subsumes it under inference. For Dharmakīrti no scripture, including even the Buddhist teaching, is a

¹ A short version of this paper was presented at the 14th World Sanskrit Conference, September 1–5, 2009, Kyoto University.

² For the proposed date of ca. the middle of the sixth century for Dharmakīrti's time of activity, see Krasser 2012.

³ The translation “scripture” for *āgama* is problematic (see Eltschinger 2007a: 17–20) and only adopted for want of a better one. *āgama* should also comprise, e.g., the eternal words of the Veda or the oral teachings of the Buddha or Mahāvīra that have been handed down without interruption.

⁴ For a general overview of Dharmakīrti's philosophical thought, see Eltschinger 2010.

⁵ See AKBh 76,22–23: *kiṃ kāraṇam / pramāṇābhāvāt / na hy eṣāṃ dravyato 'stितve kiñcid api pramāṇam asti pratyakṣam anumānam āptāgamo vā, yathā rūpādīnāṃ dharmānām iti /*; AKBh 460,2–3: *saddharmanītau tu punar buddhā eva pramāṇam buddhaputrās ca /*. See also BoBhū 25,19: *pratyakṣam anumānam āptāgamam pramāṇam niśrīṭya*. For the acceptance of these three kinds of *pramāṇas* in the VY, see Verhagen 2008; for their acceptance in other Yogācāra texts, see Eltschinger, forthcoming, n. 79.

means of valid cognition, and there can be no certainty based on scripture – quite a remarkable position for a Buddhist monk! The reason why this unambiguous understanding of scripture has not always been recognized as such is Dharmakīrti himself. He does not proclaim it very loudly – for, again, it entails that even the *buddhavacana* cannot be regarded as a *pramāṇa* – probably not only because it contradicts the definition of scripture given by Dignāga, but also because it was at odds with the attitude of the Buddhist community. Such a view certainly would not have been favoured by the spiritual authorities.

2. PVSV 108,1–109,22 ON PS 2.5ab

Dharmakīrti deals with Dignāga’s definition of scripture in the context of his theory of concept formation and language, *apoha*. One of the cornerstones of his *apoha* theory, as formulated in PV 1.213, is that words have no connection with the external world; they can only make known the intention of the speaker, not external objects.⁶ As this contradicts Dignāga’s definition of scripture, immediately after explaining this verse in his *Svavṛtti* Dharmakīrti raises the following question in order to deal with this problem:⁷

How then [should it be understood] when [Dignāga by his definition of *āptavāda*,] “The statement of a credible person is inference, because it is equal in not belying,” said that scripture is inference?⁸

⁶ PV 1.213: *nāntariyakatābhāvāc chabdānām vastubhiḥ saha / nārthasiddhis tatas te hi vaktrabhiprāyasūcakāḥ //*. “Because words are not invariably concomitant with real entities (*vastu*), therefore [they] do not establish real entities (*artha*). For they make known [only] the speaker’s intention.”

⁷ Dharmakīrti’s treatment of Dignāga’s *āptavāda* definition has been translated several times. For PV 1.213–217 with PVSV, see Yaita 1987 (included in Yaita 2005: 442–449); for PV 1.214–223 with PVSV, see Dunne 2004: 361–373; for PV 1.213–268 with PVSV, see Eltschinger 2007a: 217–385.

⁸ PVSV 108,1–2: *yat tarhīdam – āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā* (PS 2.5ab) *ity āgamasyānumānatvam uktam, tat katham /*. A more accurate translation will be offered below. As I intend to deal with Dignāga’s understanding of this definition elsewhere, in the following I will discuss only the problems related to Dharmakīrti’s treatment of it. For (different) interpretations of PS 2.5ab, see Eltschinger 2007a: 70 (with n. 9), 218ff., and Lasic 2010.

Dharmakīrti devotes 4 verses with commentary to the solution of this problem, in which he provides two different interpretations of this definition.⁹ Of these interpretations I will refer only to those statements that are necessary for my argumentation.

2.1. Why did Dignāga provide a definition of scripture?

Immediately following the posing of the above question Dharmakīrti tells us why we are in need of *āgama* at all.

A person cannot live without relying on the validity of scripture because he has heard that in the case of certain [activities] the results of which cannot be perceived, engaging or not engaging [lead to] extremely praiseworthy or disastrous [results], and because he does not see anything that contradicts the presence of those [results]. Therefore [Dignāga] taught that the validity [of scripture] is due to a critical examination [of it, having in mind] “given that one has to proceed, it is better to proceed in such a way [i.e. critically examining the scripture]”^{10,11}

... If that [treatise,] upon being examined, is not liable to making false assertions (*na ... viśamvādabhāk*), [then] the one who proceeds might shine (*śobheta*)!¹²

In other words: We do need religion because it is the only means to escape *samsāra*. Thus, we have to base our religious activities on *āgama*.

⁹ For a helpful synopsis and concise summary of this excursus on PS 2.5ab, see Yaita 1987: 2–3 and Dunne 2004: 240–241. For proposed changes, see below p. 100 n. 38.

¹⁰ Cf. PVSVT 390,30–391,9: ***tat sati pravartitavye varam evam āgamaṃ parikṣya pravṛtta ity āgamasya parikṣayā prāmāṇyam āhācāryaḥ***.

¹¹ PVSV 108,2–6: *nāyaṃ puruṣo 'nāśrityāgamaprāmāṇyam āsitum samarthaḥ, atyakṣa-phalānāṃ keṣāñcit pravṛttinivṛttyor mahānuśamsāpāyaśravaṇāt^a tadbhāve virodhā-darśanāc ca. tat sati pravartitavye varam evaṃ pravṛtta iti parikṣayā prāmāṇyam āha.*

^a °*āpāya*° PVSV_{ms} 25a2 (TSP 4,22–23; PVSVT_{ms} 140b6; *nan soṇ* PVSV_{Tib} D322a4/P478b3; see Yaita 2005: 443 n. 159) : °*āpāpa*° PVSV, PVSVT 390,25.

¹² PVSV 108,15–16: *tad yadi na parikṣayāṃ viśamvādabhāk pravartamānaḥ śobheta.*

2.2. PV 1.214–215: Which āgama should be followed?

In order to decide which *āgama* we should follow – this is explained in PV 1.214 with commentary – we have to look for a scripture that is coherent (*sambaddha*) and teaches a proper human aim (*puruṣārtha*) as well as a suitable means for obtaining it (*anugūṇopāya*). If we find such a scripture, for example that of the Buddhists, then we have to examine it in its entirety, as explained in PV 1.215 with PVSV. Whatever it teaches that can be checked by perception and inference has to be true. Anything taught in such a scripture must not be contradicted by perception or inference. Moreover, there cannot be a single internal contradiction in it. Such internal contradictions are checked with the help of the so-called *āgamāpekṣānumāna* (PVSV 109,1),¹³ i.e., an inference that, based on passages of the scripture, tests its consistency.¹⁴ If an *āgama* passes this threefold test¹⁵ – whereby it is tested in all testable

¹³ Later (PVSV 174,22–23; see above, p. 69) Dharmakīrti uses the formulation *āgamāśrayeṇa cānumānena*. In contrast to this kind of inference an inference that operates with visible matters is called *anāgamāpekṣānumāna* (PVSV 108,24). In the fourth chapter Dharmakīrti terms this latter kind of *anumāna* together with perception as *vastubalapravṛttapramāṇa* (PV 4.108 ≈ PVin 3 31,11: *yac chāstraṃ vastubalapravṛttena pramāṇena svavacanena cābādhitam dṛśyādrśyayor viśayayoḥ, tad grāhyam iti*). These two kinds of inferences are already distinguished by Pakṣilasvāmin (NBh 3,12 on NSū 1.1.1: *pratyakṣāgamāśritaṃ cānumanam*).

¹⁴ On the application of this method as described in PV 1.214–215 by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, see McClintock 2010: 318ff.

¹⁵ A possible source of this threefold analysis, which came to be known as *dpyad pa gsum* in the later Tibetan tradition, might be Vasubandhu's VY; see Verhagen 2008: 244–247 (Section Four, “Three *pramāṇas*”) with the appendix (pp. 253–258). A similar idea is encountered in the definition of *āptāgama* in ASBh 153,5ff.: *yatropa-deṣe tat pratyakṣam anumānam ca sarvathā na virudhyete na vyabhicarataḥ sa āptāgamaḥ sampratyaivitvāt*. “Die Unterweisung, zu der diese Wahrnehmung und [diese] Schlußfolgerung in keiner Weise im Widerspruch steht [und von der] diese nicht abweichen, ist *āptāgama*, weil er Vertrauen erweckt.” Translation Oberhammer et al. 1991: 122^b–123^a s.v. *āptāgama*. On the background of the Tibetan “threefold analysis (*dpyad pa gsum*)” see Tillemans 1993: 10ff., and Keira 2006: 182 with n. 15, who informs us that the notion of “purified through the threefold analysis (*tshul gsum gyi brtag pas yoṅs su dag pa*)” is already found in Kamalaśīla's MĀ (D148b4–5): [*de'i phyir*] *bka' gañ žig tshul gsum gyi brtag pas yoṅs su dag pa thog ma dañ tha ma dañ bar du dge bar nes pa de ni mi slu ba'i phyir de mkhas pa rnams kyis brten par bya ba ñid do //*. “[Therefore,] since statements ascertained as faultless by means of three kinds of investigation (*tshul gsum gyi brtag pas*) and as excellent for the first

cases (*śakyaparicchedaśeṣaviṣayaviśuddhi*, PVSV 109,3–4) – and is thus established to be without contradictions, its being pure or cleansed (*viśuddhi*)¹⁶ constitutes its non-belying nature or reliability (*avisamvāda*, PVSV 109,4). “Non-belying” is of course the definitional characteristic of a valid cognition.¹⁷ If a scripture is “purified” in this way, then we can infer that this scripture or testimony of a credible person (*āptavāda*) might be true also with regard to the non-empirical or transcendent things¹⁸ it teaches, because the scripture or credible person is the same. And if then, based on that scripture, one acts towards non-empirical objects one might be lucky and obtain what one was looking for (see n. 12).

2.3. Does PV 1.216 comment upon PS 2.5ab?

Up to this point the existing interpretations and translations of PV(SV) (see n. 7) more or less agree, and I have followed them thus far. The situation changes, however, with the next verse, i.e., PV 1.216. Scholars disagree about the meanings of the words *agatyā* and *sāmānyāt* and

[stage of practice, i.e., hearing (*śruti*)], the last [stage, i.e., meditation (*bhāvanā*)], and the middle [stage, i.e., consideration (*cintā*)], are non-belying (*avisamvāda*), scholars should rely upon such [statements].” On the resemblance of Dharmakīrti’s threefold test to Āryadeva’s CŚ 12.5 (= 12.280 in Tillemans counting), see Tillemans 1990: 1.29–32.

¹⁶ The choice of the term *viśuddhi* might have been inspired by a similar use in the *Ślo-kavārttika*, where *śuddhatva* of the causes guarantees the validity of the resulting cognition; see ŚV *codanā* 44ab: *tasmāt kāraṇaśuddhatvaṃ jñānaprāmāṇyakāraṇam*. “Therefore (*tasmāt*), the cause of validity in a cognition (*jñānaprāmāṇyakāraṇam*) is the excellence of causes (*kāraṇaśuddhatvam*).” Translation Kataoka 2011a: 248. See also Kataoka’s n. 189 on the translation of k. 46, where the term *śuddhyasambhava* is used.

¹⁷ See PV 2.1ab₁: *pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam*. “Valid cognition is non-belying cognition.”

¹⁸ In this context Dharmakīrti refers to these kinds of things as “not knowable by perception or inference” (*pratyakṣānumānāgamye ’py arthe* PVSV 109,8). Later he also uses the term *atyantaparokṣa* (PVSV 153,7, 155,14, 175,3–4, PV 1.314c, 1.316a, 3.94, 4.210). For his usage of *parokṣa* in the sense of *atyantaparokṣa*, see Tillemans 1986: 44 n. 14 (= 1999b: 34 n. 13). The term *atyantaparokṣa* is also used by Uddyotakara (NV 204,12 on NSū 2.1.31) and occurs also in YD 70,15 on SK 4ab₁, 99,12 on SK 6cd, and 101,7 still on SK 6cd.

about the overall purport of the verse. Thus, it seems appropriate to have a closer look at the different positions.

2.3.1. Previous interpretations of PV 1.216

Let me begin with Tom Tillemans, to whom we owe much of our understanding of the Buddhist epistemologists' approach to scripture. In his article "Dharmakīrti, Āryadeva, and Dharmapāla on scriptural authority" he provides us with the following translation of the statement of Dignāga's we have been considering:

PS II, k. 5a: Because authoritative words (*āptavāda*) are similar [to an inference] in not belying, they are [classified as] inference. (Tillemans 1986: 32 = 1999b: 27ff.)

In his summary of Dharmakīrti's PV 1.216, which if I understand him correctly¹⁹ he considers together with PV 1.215 to be the core of Dharmakīrti's explanation of PS 2.5ab, Tillemans gives a slightly different account of Dignāga's statement. But first, let us have a look at Tillemans' translation of PV 1.216.

*āptavādāviśaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā /
buddher agatyābhīhitā parokṣe 'py asya gocare //* PV 1.216

As authoritative words are similar in being *aviśaṃvāda*, the understanding of their imperceptible (*parokṣa*) object is also termed an inference, for [otherwise] there would be no way [to know such objects]. (Tillemans 1993: 11)²⁰

On the basis of this translation of PV 1.216 Dignāga's position in PS 2.5ab is summarized by Tillemans as follows:

(d) v. 216: Dignāga's point in saying that authoritative words were an inference was that when an authority's words (= scripture) have been found to be non-belying on rationally decidable matters, then we are jus-

¹⁹ I derive this understanding from the fact that Tillemans presents Dignāga's PS 2.5ab together with PV 1.215–216 twice in order to outline "the epistemological school's position" on scripture (Tillemans 1990: 1.24ff.) and the background of the Tibetan "threefold analysis (*dpyad pa gsum*)" (Tillemans 1993: 10ff.).

²⁰ Also translated in Tillemans 1990: 1.25.

tified to understand radically inaccessible matters based on that scripture.... (Tillemans 1999a: 399–400 = 1999b: 41–42)

I would subscribe to Tillemans' translation of PV 1.216, though we shall have to come back to the expression *agatyā* later (below, pp. 108–111). Nevertheless, Dharmakīrti's understanding of PS 2.5ab in the way Tillemans is suggesting poses a problem. I cannot see any basis in the wording of PS 2.5ab itself for saying that *our understanding* of the transcendent object of scripture is termed an inference. It is one thing to say that *āptavacana* is *anumāna* and another that our cognition of its object is *anumāna*. In other words, did Dharmakīrti over-interpret or even misinterpret Dignāga, or must we understand Dignāga in a different way?

As the *āgama*-section of Dharmakīrti's PVSV has been translated by Hideomi Yaita in 1987, by John Dunne in 2004, and by Vincent Eltschinger in 2007a, we may gain some help from considering their interpretations. Before looking at their analyses it should be mentioned that PS(V) 2.5ab is incorporated by Dharmakīrti in his PV(SV) twice, and that he interprets it somewhat differently each time. First, he refers to it when initially raising the question of its meaning, and then about a page later in the Gnoli edition, in concluding his first interpretation of PS(V) 5ab. On its first occurrence it is marked as a quotation,²¹ on the second Dignāga's wording is used without explicitly characterising it as a quotation. The latter passage, namely PV 1.216, is commented upon by Dharmakīrti as follows:

*āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā /
buddher agatyābhihitā parokṣe 'py asya gocare // PV 1.216*

*tasya cāsyaiambhūtasya āptavādasyāvisaṃvādasāmānyād adṛṣṭavyabhi-
cārasya pratyakṣānumānāgamye 'py arthe pratipattes tadāśrayatvāt tad-
anyapratipattivad avisaṃvādo 'numiyate / tataḥ śabdaprabhavāpi satī na
śābdavad abhiprāyaṃ nivedayaty evety arthāvisaṃvādād anumānam api /
(PVSV 109,8–11)*

²¹ PVSV 108,1–2: *yat tarhīdam āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatety āgamasyā-
numānatvam uktam, tat katham.*

Dunne's translation of the verse with commentary reads,²²

[Dignāga] said that, since the statements of a credible person are generally trustworthy, a cognition from such statements of those statement's object is a well formed inference of that object, even though the object is epistemically remote. The cognition is said to be an inference because there is no other way to know that object. [PV 1.216]

These kinds of statements of a credible person – those [described by Dignāga] and those [accordingly delineated above] – are generally (*sāmānyā*) trustworthy. Hence, not observing those statements to be misleading, one infers the trustworthiness of a cognition of those statements' object, even though it is not knowable by perception and empirical inference. One infers that such a cognition is trustworthy because it is based on those statements, just like the other cognitions based on those statements that can be verified by perception and empirical inference.

Hence, even though that cognition comes from language, it does not make known just the speaker's intention like a cognition coming from [ordinary] language because in this case the cognition is also an inference of the statement's objects, since it is trustworthy with regard to those objects (*artha*). (Dunne 2004: 363ff.)

Here it is clear, as we have already seen in the translation of Tillemans, that in the verse our *cognition* of a transcendent object derived from the statements of a credible person is said to be an inference. However, Dunne's translation of the earlier occurrence of PS 2.5ab, where Dharmakīrti quotes it (PVSV 108,1–2) to introduce his discussion of scripture, construes the *testimony* of a credible person as a source for an inference.

[Dignāga] said, "The testimony of a credible person is the source for an inference because it is generally trustworthy,"... (Dunne 2004: 361)

In a section earlier in his book which gives a general account of scriptural inference, titled "Scriptural Inference and Dharmakīrti's Rejection of Credibility," Dunne translates the same passage in another way.

²² In the translation offered by John Dunne his explanatory remarks are not always written in brackets in order to present a smooth text readable also for non-specialists. However, they easily can be recognized as such.

Since the statements of a credible person are generally trustworthy, a cognition arising from them is an instrumental inference. (Dunne 2004: 239)

In the footnote to the translation Dunne justifies this interpretation with reference to PV 1.216.

Note, first, that although the phrase “a cognition arising from them” must be supplied by context, Dharmakīrti clearly understands this statement in that fashion (see PV 1.216, translated along with the rest of the section on scripture in the appendix).

Interestingly enough, this double understanding of one and the same passage – as referring to either scripture or the cognition that arises from it as an inference – is also to be found in Hideomi Yaita’s treatment of Dharmakīrti’s view of scripture. In his synopsis he summarises the passage we have just referred to as follows:

Opponent (108,1f.): Dharmakīrti’s statement is not consistent with Dignāga’s statement in *PS* II 5ab, which recognized *āgama* (*āptavāda*) as a *pramāṇa*, i.e. *anumāna*. (Yaita 1987: 2)

His translation of PVSV 108,1–2 reads,

(Opponent:) Then, how [do you explain] the fact that [Dignāga] said the sacred tradition (*āgama*) is [a *pramāṇa*, that is] *anumāna* [in his following statement:] “Because the words of a credible person (*āptavāda*) generally do not disagree, [the cognition based on it] is an inference (*anumāna*)”? (Yaita 1987: 6)

The above interpretation of *PS* 2.5ab in this *pūrvapakṣa* is obviously based on PV 1.216.

Because the word of a credible person (*āptavāda*) generally does not disagree [with our experience], the cognition [based on *āgama*] even with regard to its (= *āgama*’s) object beyond the range [of any means of knowledge] is said [by Dignāga] to be an inference, for there is no [other] possibility (*agatyā*) [to explain it]. (Yaita 1987: 8)²³

²³ Van Bijlert (1989: 123–124) is also of the opinion that PV 1.216 is an explanation of *PS* 2.5ab: “In the next verse Dharmakīrti uses this general conception of trustworthiness to give his first explanation of *PS* II.5ab ... (PV 1.216).”

Eltschinger (2007a: 219, 224) does not read PVSV 108,1–2 in light of PV 1.216 but treats both passages independently. Thus, the question remains: Did Dignāga say in PS 2.5ab that scripture is a kind of inference or did he term our *understanding* of their transcendent (*parokṣa*) objects an inference, or did he say both?

2.3.2. On the context of PV 1.216 with PVSV

As I cannot see how one can harmonize these two interpretations, the one clearly saying that *āgama* is inference (PVSV 108,1–2), the other that our cognition is inference (k. 216), it seems worthwhile to have another look at the context of PS 2.5ab.²⁴ This has been nicely summarized by Tillemans when arguing against Hayes' interpretation of PS 2.5ab in his monograph *Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs*.

2) In the immediately preceding passage to k. 5, Dignāga had made a distinction between two types of inference, depending upon whether the object is empirical or non-empirical, arguing that in the former case we can apply names to what is empirical, but in the latter case we only have a concept (*rnam par rtog pa = vikalpa*) and do not cognize the *svalakṣaṇa* object.

3) An opponent then tries to find an absurdity, saying that in that case authoritative statements about imperceptible objects would just express the conceptually invented object and not the real particular at all: hence there would be no difference between authoritative and unauthoritative statements.

4) Dignāga then replies that authoritative statements about heaven and the like do not express *just* the conceptually invented object: they are similar to normal inference because they too are non-belying with regard to the real particular. For, although the heavens and so forth are beyond our sense range, authoritative people have directly seen them and hence were able to apply the words "heaven," etc. (Tillemans 1990: 1.22)

Tillemans had to base his summary on the two barely intelligible Tibetan translations of the PS(V) by Vasudhararakṣita and Kanakavarman. With the help of Jinendrabuddhi's commentary in Sanskrit we

²⁴ On the wider structural position of PS 2.5ab, see Lasic 2010: 514–522.

now can get a more nuanced picture. The opponent referred to by Tillemans in (3) in fact asks how this latter cognition operating with a non-empirical object which is a mere concept of the object can be inference (*katham tarhi tasyānumānatvam*).²⁵ Dignāga introduces his answer to this question by mentioning words such as heaven, the referent of which we never have seen: “For (*hi*) words like ‘heaven’ do not express the mere object (*arthamātra*).”²⁶ Next follows PS 2.5ab with the *Vṛtti*.

āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatvam / PS 2.5ab
*āptavacanam grhītvārthāvisaṃvādatulyatvāt tasyānumānatvam uktam.*²⁷

²⁵ A possible Sanskrit can be reconstructed as follows: *adrṣṭārtha arthavikalpamātram, na viśiṣṭārthapratītiḥ. katham tarhi tasyānumānatvam. na hi svargādiśabdair arthamātram ucyate.* (= PSV_K 111a2–3: *ma mthoñ ba'i don la don du rnam par rtog pa tsam yin gyi don gyi khyad par rtogs pa ni ma yin no // ji ltar de rjes su dpag pa ñid yin te mtho ris la sogs pa'i sgra rnams kyis don tsam brjod ba ni ma yin no //*). The Sanskrit is available in PST_{ms} 62b7: *adrṣṭārthe svargādāv arthavikalpamātram iti* (PST_{Tib} D92a2/P103b1–2: *ma mthoñ ba'i don la ni mtho ris la sogs pa la ste / don du rnam par rtog pa tsam zes pa*), quoted in PVSV 37,27; PST_{ms} 63a5: *tataś ced arthavikalpamātram bhavati, na viśiṣṭārthapratītiḥ* (PST_{Tib} D92a7/P103b7–8: *de las gal te don rnam par rtog pa tsam du 'gyur gyi don gyi khyad par rtogs par mi 'gyur na*); PST_{ms} 63a4: *katham tarhi tasyānumānatvam iti* (PST_{Tib} D92a6/P103b7: *'o na ci ltar de rjes su dpag pa yin ze na zes pa /*); PST_{ms} 63a6: *āha – na hītyādi* (PST_{Tib} D92b1–2/P104a2: *bśad pa / ma yin zes pa la sogs pa ste /*); PST_{ms} 63a7: *tasmān nāptaprayuktaiḥ svargādiśabdair arthamātram ucyate. kiṃ tarhi. laukikaśabdāsādhāraṇe bāhye 'py artha iti* (PST_{Tib} D92b2–3/P104a3–4: *de'i phyir yid ches pas rab tu sbyar ba'i mtho ris la sogs pa'i sgra rnams kyī* (read: *kyis*) *don tsam brjod pa ma yin gyi / 'o na ci ze na / 'jig rten pa'i sgra dañ thun moñ ma yin pa'i phyi rol gyi don yañ ño zes pa'o //*).

²⁶ *na hi svargādiśabdair arthamātram ucyate*, see above, n. 25.

²⁷ For the reconstruction of the Sanskrit text (following mainly the Tibetan translation of Vasudhararakṣita), see below, p. 94. The Tibetan translation reads:

yid ches tshig kyañ mi slu bar // mtshuñs phyir rjes su dpag pa ñid // PS 2.5ab
yid ches pa'i tshig ñid bzuñ nas kyañ mi bslu bar mtshuñs pa'i phyir de yañ rjes su dpag pa ñid du brjod do // PSV_v 29a2–3.

yid ches tshig ni mi slu ba // spyi las rjes su dpag pa ñid // PS 2.5ab
yid ches pa'i tshig ñid bzuñ nas don de la mi bslu ba'i phyir dañ / mi 'dra ba'i phyir rjes su dpag pa ñid du bśad pa yin te // PSV_K 111a3–4.

... (PS 2.5ab). Having grasped the statement of a credible person, *it (tasya)* has been said to be inference, because [it] is equal in not belying with regard to the object.

If I understand Dignāga's wording in the commentary correctly, this is the answer to the initial question *kathaṃ tarhi tasyānumānatvam*, referring to our *cognition* of *svarga* etc., the object of which never has been seen by us but only by the *āptas*. This interpretation goes smoothly with Jinendrabuddhi's comments when he says that the question, now reformulated as *kasmāt punas tasyānumānatvam* to conform to the wording he has previously used,²⁸ has to be answered by *arthā-visaṃvādatulyatvāt*. Jinendrabuddhi's comments read,

*āptavacanam gṛhītvetyādi. āptavacanam gṛhītāvīsaṃvādādhigamahe-
tum tasyānumānatvam uktam^a. kasmāt punas tasyānumānatvam arthā-
visaṃvādatulyatvād iti vyākhyeyam. PST_{ms} 63b5–6 (yid ches pa'i tshig
bzuñ nas źes pa la sogs pa ste yid ches pa'i tshig bzuñ nas mi bslu bar rtogs
pa'i rgyur / de rjes su dpag pa ñid du gsuñs so // ci'i phyir de rjes su dpag
pa ñid yin źe na / don la mi bslu bar mtshuñs pa ñid kyī phyir źes bśad
par bya'o // PST_{Tib} D93a1–2/P104b2–4)*

^a *uktam* em. (*gsuñs so* PST_{Tib}) : *yuktam* PST_{ms}

“**Having grasped the statement of a credible person**” and so forth. *It (tasya)* has been said to be an inference, having grasped the statement of a credible person which is a logical reason (*hetu*) for an understanding that [it] is not belying (*avisaṃvāda*). [The question] why now *this (tasya)* is an inference is to be explained by “**because [it] is equal in not belying with regard to the object**” (*arthāvisaṃvādatulyatvāt*).

tasya in Jinendrabuddhi's explanation thus would have the same meaning as it has in Dignāga's initial question and refer to the inference which is a mere concept, which would correspond to Dharmakīrti's *buddeḥ* in PV 1.216 or *pratipatteḥ* in the *Svavṛtti*. And Dharmakīrti's *āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyāt* of PV 1.216, finally, would be his rephrasing of Dignāga's *arthāvisaṃvādatulyatvāt*. Thus, I propose to

²⁸ PST_{ms} 63a4: *kathaṃ tarhi tasyānumānatvam iti* (PST_{Tib} D92a6/P103b7: 'o na ci ltar de rjes su dpag pa yin źe na źes pa /); see above, p. 93 n. 25.

understand PV 1.216 together with the *Svavṛtti* as commenting upon Dignāga's *Vṛtti* on PS 2.5ab and not on PS 2.5ab itself.²⁹

2.4. On *sāmānyāt*

The various interpretations of *sāmānyāt* have already been addressed by Lasic (2010: 511–514), whose main concern is a possible interpretation of PS 2.5ab in its own right, not Dharmakīrti's interpretation. Thus, he does not offer a solution for how to understand it in Dharmakīrti.

2.4.1 On the meaning of the ablative ending

The ablative ending of *sāmānya* has been translated in two ways: (1) as “insofar,” etc., and (2) as “because,” etc. Hayes' (1980: 252, 1988: 238) interpretation of the ablative as “insofar” has been refuted convincingly by Tillemans (1990: 1.20–21).³⁰ The interpretation of the ablative as “because,” “since,” and the like, to which I subscribe, is favoured by the majority of scholars.

2.4.2. On the meaning of *sāmānya*

Also regarding the meaning of *sāmānya* there are two camps. One takes it as “similar” or “equal,” etc., the other understands it as “in general” or “generally.” The latter translation has been proposed by Yaita (1987: 6, 8) and van Bijlert (1989: 124), and it is also the one preferred by Dunne. Dunne (2004: 363–364 n. 10) argues for this interpretation against the understanding of Śākyabuddhi in order to avoid a contradiction with PV 1.218. He does so even at the risk of attributing to Dharmakīrti a form of fallacious reasoning that Dharmakīrti himself refers to as *śeṣavadanumāna* – and which, as we will see later, also pertains to Dignāga's definition and Dharmakīrti's interpretation of it, as

²⁹ It goes without saying that, disregarding the context, *tasya* in PSV as well as in PST easily could be understood as referring to *āptavacana*. In that case, however, we have to assume that the question *kathaṃ tarhi tasyānumānatvam* remains completely ignored.

³⁰ This refutation holds good also for van Bijlert's interpretation “in so far” (1989: 122).

well as to Śākyabuddhi's comments – by apparently taking the term “in general” in the stronger sense of “universally, without exception.” He writes, “On this interpretation, the argument is that, since the statements of a particular author have been observed to be trustworthy in terms of observable objects, this general trustworthiness may be extended to unobservable objects.” This understanding leads Dunne to the following translation of PVSV 109,7–9 (on k. 216, see above p. 90):

These kinds of statements by a credible person – those [described by Dignāga] and those [accordingly delineated above] – are generally trustworthy. Hence, not observing those statements to be misleading, one infers the trustworthiness of a cognition of those statements' object, even though it is not knowable by perception and empirical inference.³¹ (Dunne 2004: 364)

This translation is fine, given that *sāmānyāt* means “generally.” Dharmakīrti here speaks of a *sāmānya* in terms of *avisamvāda* of two kinds of statements: *tasya cāsyaiavambhūtasyāptavādasya*.³² The first one referred to by *tasya* is, according to Karṇakagomin, the *āgama* said by Dignāga to be *anumāna*. The second one addressed by *asyaiavambhūtasya* is the one that, in accordance with what has been said in k. 214, has been found to be coherent (*sambaddha*) and to teach a proper human aim (*puruṣārtha*) as well as a suitable means for obtaining it (*anugūṇopāya*), which then has been tested and ascertained to be trustworthy as described in k. 215 with PVSV.³³ The *āgama* at stake in Dignāga concerns heaven (*svarga*), which is not accessible to our knowledge. Thus,

³¹ PVSV 109,7–9: *tasya cāsyaiavambhūtasyāptavādasyāvisamvādasāmānyād adṛṣṭavyabhicārasya pratyakṣānumānāgamye 'py arthe pratipattes tadāśrayatvāt tadanya-pratipattivād avisamvādo 'numīyate.*

³² Here one would expect another *ca*: *evambhūtasya ca*. But this is not supported by the commentaries. PVSV_{Tib} D322b6–7/P479a7 (*de dan 'di de lta bur gyur pa'i ñes pa zad pa'i tshig*) suggests the reading: *tasyāsyaiavambhūtasya* or *tasyāsyaiavambhūtasya ca*. The text either needs to be corrected or we have to suppose that *ca* is misplaced (*bhinnakrama*).

³³ PVSVT 394,9–10: *tasyāgamasyācāryadignāgena nirdiṣṭānumānabhāvasya. asyetyasmābhis^a sambaddhānugūṇopāyam^b ityādinā vicāritasya.*

^a *asmābhiḥ* refers to Dharmakīrti; cf., e.g., the comment on *atrocyate* (PVSV 39,30): *atra sāmānyalakṣaṇe 'smābhir ucyate* (PVSVT 174,21).

^b *sambaddhānugūṇopāyam* em. (PV 1.214) : *sambandhād anugūṇopāyam* PVSVT, PVSVT_{ms} 142a1.

Dharmakīrti would be saying that “these kinds of statements by a credible person – those [that speak about heaven] and those [accordingly delineated above] – are generally trustworthy.” This implies that “statements speaking about heaven are generally trustworthy,” whereby “generally trustworthy” means “checked by the threefold test.” In order to avoid this problematic implication one can assume, of course, that Dharmakīrti with *tasya* does not mean anything special and only wants to inform us that Dignāga considers even that part of *āgama* he isn’t specifically concerned with to be trustworthy.

Be that as it may be, it is in any case not clear why general trustworthiness justifies Dignāga’s holding the *āgama* that speaks of heaven to be *anumāna*. This leads us to the question, On what basis can Dignāga, according to Dharmakīrti, claim *āgama* to be *anumāna*, even when *sāmānya* is understood as “similar” or “equal,” etc., in terms of its being *avisamvāda*? First, however, one must answer the question, Similar to what? It seems there are two possibilities: (a) either leave it open, as I have done in the translation of PVSV 108,1–2 (see above, p. 84), or (b) take it specifically as “similar to inference.” Those who have opted for the first alternative are Hayes (1988: 238), “insofar as they have the common character of not being false,” Tillemans (1990: 20), “because authoritative words are similar in not belying” (similarly, Tillemans 1993: 10, 11), and Eltschinger (2007a: 219), “est semblable en fiabilité.” Yet the same scholars have also on occasion opted for the second alternative: Hayes (1980: 252), “insofar as they have (in) common (with inference the) character of not being false,” Tillemans (1986: 32), “because authoritative speech (*āptavāda*) is similar [to an inference] in being infallible,” and (1990: 22), “they are similar to normal inference because they too are non-belying,” and Eltschinger (2007a: 224), “est semblable [à l’inférence] en fiabilité.”

Thus, the statement of a credible person with regard to transcendent objects such as heaven is either said to be inference on account of the general trustworthiness of the words of this credible person regarding perceptible and inferable matters, or on account of their being similar to normal inference in not being belying. Both interpretations are far from being self-evident, nor is there any commentarial support for them, as far as I can tell. There are, however, clear statements by the commentators that Dignāga in PS 2.5ab intended what Dharmakīrti would later call a *svabhāvahetu* and that *anumāna* should be under-

stood in the sense of logical reason (*liṅga, hetu*).³⁴ This did not escape Dunne, who provides the relevant material in the footnotes to his translation. The commentators also tell us that the equality or similarity is between the statements of a credible person concerning matters that can be checked by perception and inference and transcendent matters such as heaven that we cannot check. Already the comments by Śākyabuddhi (followed by Karṇakagomin) on the opening question at PVSV 108,1–2 are quite telling.

Any statement of a credible person is non-belying, like [a statement] such as “All conditioned things are momentary.” And this is a statement with regard to a transcendent object. Thus, this too is non-belying. Because **the statement of a credible person** is non-belying (*avisamvāditvāt*, [PVSVṬ, no equivalent in PVT]) **as its character of being non-belying is the same** in the way [explained] (*evam*), it **is inference**. Thus (*iti*), the teacher Dignāga said that scripture is inference with regard to the external object.³⁵ (Also translated in Dunne 2004: 361 n. 2)

Śākyabuddhi’s and Karṇakagomin’s comments on PV 1.216 are also quite clear on the point that the character of being non-belying in the case of a credible person’s statement concerning transcendent matters is equal to or the same as this person’s statement concerning matters that can be checked. And it is for this reason that *āptavāda* serves as an

³⁴ For *āptavacana* as a *kāryahetu* see Tillemans’ explanation on PV 4.92 (Tillemans 2000: 126ff.).

³⁵ PVT Je D242b3–5/P285b6–286a1: *gal te phyi rol gyi dños po la sgra tshad ma ñid yod pa ma yin na / ‘on kyañ gañ ‘di yid ches tshig ni mi slu ba spyi las* (PVSV 108,1) *te gañ dañ gañ ñes pa zad pa’i tshig de dañ de ni mi slu ba yin te / dper na ‘dus byas thams cad ni skad cig ma źes bya ba la sogs pa lta bu’o // śin tu lkog tu gyur pa’i don la ñes par zad pa’i tshig ‘di yañ yin no // de bas na ‘di yañ mi slu ba yin no źes bya ba de lta na ñes pa zad pa’i tshig ni mi slu ba spyi las rjes su dpag pa ñid yin pa de ltar na / slob dpon gyi* (read: *gyis*) *luñ ni phyi rol gyi don la rjes su dpag pa ñid du gsuñs pa yin no // ≈ PVSVṬ 390,15–19: yadi bāhye vastuni śabdasya nāsti prāmānyam, yat tarhidam āptavādāvisamvādasāmānyāt. yo ya āptavādaḥ, so ‘visamvādī, yathā kṣaṇikāḥ sarve saṃskārā ityādikaḥ. āptavādaś cāyam atyantaparokṣe ‘py arthe. tasmād ayam apy avisamvādītyevam āptavādasyāvisamvādasāmānyād avisamvāditvād anumānatety āgamasya bāhye ‘rthe ‘numānatvam uktam ācāryadignāgena.*

inferential mark³⁶ on account of which we can infer that our cognition does not belie.

“Because that credible person’s speech is the same in its trustworthiness (*avisamvādasāmānyāt*). That is, just as the credible person’s speech is trustworthy with regard to an object that can be determined [through perception and ordinary inference], likewise it is trustworthy with regard to an extremely remote object also, precisely because it is the speech of a credible person.” (Dunne 2004: 364 n. 10) It is therefore that the teacher Dignāga termed an inference a cognition arising from an inferential mark characterized as [this] person’s credible speech that [such a cognition] is not belying with regard to a real state of affairs (*don la mi slu ba ... blo ni, *arthāvisamvādabuddheḥ*).³⁷

This interpretation of Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin is in accord with what Dharmakīrti himself explained in PVSV 109,8–11 when commenting on PV 1.216 (see above p. 89). Thus, I can see no harm in accepting this interpretation and translating PS 2.5ab from the viewpoint of Dharmakīrti as follows:

Because the character of being non-belying of a statement of a credible person is the same [in the case of transcendent objects as in the case of objects that are accessible to us, it] is an inference [in the sense of an inferential mark].

sāmānyāt in PV 1.216 might be understood accordingly. It goes without saying that for the time being such an understanding is justified only

³⁶ Jinendrabuddhi (PST_{ms} 63b5–6, referred to above, p. 94) also explains the statement of a credible person to be a logical reason: *āptavacanam gṛhītvāvisamvādādhigama-hetuṃ tasyānumānatvam uktam*.

³⁷ PVṠ Je D245a7–b1/P289b5–7: ***ñes pa zad pa’i tshig de ni mi slu bar mtshuñs pa’i phyir te / ci ltar mñon sum dañ rjes su dpag pas mi slu ba’i don yoñs su gcod par nus pa la ñes pa zad pa’i tshig mi slu ba de ltar śin tu lkog tu gyur pa*** (read: *pa la*) *yañ yin te / ñes pa zad pa’i tshig ñid yin pa’i phyir ro // de bas na don la mi slu ba ñes pa zad pa’i tshig gi mtshan ñid can gyi rtags las byuñ pa’i blo ni rjes su dpag pa ñid du slob dpon gyis brjod do //* ≈ PVSVṠ 393,25–28: *tasyāptavādasyāvisamvādasāmānyāt*.^a *yathā śakyaparicchede ’rthe āptavādasyāvisamvādaḥ, tathātyantaparokṣe ’pi, āptavādatvād eva. tataś cāptavādalaḥṣaṅgāl līngād utpannāyā avisamvādabuddher anu-mānatācāryadignāgenābhīhitā*.

^a *tasyāptavādasyāvisamvādasāmānyāt* PVSVṠ_{ms} 141b6 (PVṠ) : *tasyās tāvad asyā-visamvādāt sāmānyāt* PVSVṠ.

for Dharmakīrti. Whether this interpretation is faithful to Dignāga's understanding still remains to be investigated.

2.5. PV 1.217 – a second interpretation of PS 2.5ab

The above interpretation probably is the best Dharmakīrti could come up with without contradicting Dignāga's wording, although I cannot see anything in Dignāga's phrasing that would suggest that a scripture must be tested in its entirety, as proposed by Dharmakīrti. Perhaps because this is hardly possible Dharmakīrti provides us with a second, less demanding interpretation of Dignāga's *āgama* definition, according to which a person's reliability with regard to transcendent objects is inferred from his knowledge of the main religious teachings that he presents, such as the Four Noble[s] Truths.³⁸

*heyopādeyatattvasya sopāyasya prasiddhitāḥ /
pradhānārthāvisaṃvādād anumānaṃ paratra vā // PV 1.217*

*heyopādeyatadupāyānāṃ tadupadiṣṭānāṃ avaiparītyam avisaṃvādaḥ. ya-
thā catūrṇām āryasatyānāṃ vakṣyamāṇanītyā. tasyāsya puruṣārthopayo-
gino 'bhiyogārhasyāvisaṃvādād viṣayāntare 'pi tathātvopagamo na vipra-
lambhāya, anuparodhān niṣprayojanavitathābhīdhānavaiḥphalyāc ca vak-
tuḥ. PVSV 109,15–19*

Or [scripture] is inference with regard to the other [domain] due to its being not belying with regard to the principal points [i.e. the Four Noble(s) Truths], because the nature (*tattva*) of what is to be abandoned and what is to be realized together with their means is well established [by it].

³⁸ I consider the method proposed in PV 1.217 as an alternative to the threefold analysis, i.e., the second possibility proposed by Dunne (2004: 241): "This test either supplements or perhaps replaces ... the threefold analysis." Yaita and Tillemans consider it differently: "On the basis of credibility of *āgama* examined like that, Dharmakīrti proves the non-disagreement of the *āgama* even with regard to inaccessible thing talked of by the author, in the following two ways (v. 216–7)" (Yaita 1987: 3); "(e) v. 217 elaborates upon aspects of v. 216: when the scripture is non-belying on important rationally accessible things it should also be so on the inaccessible things" (Tillemans 1999a: 400 = 1999b: 42).

Reliability consists in the fact that what is to be obtained and what is to be avoided [together with] their means, which has been taught by that [credible person], corresponds to reality (*avaiparītya*); like the Four Noble(s) Truths in the way it will be explained [in the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter]. Because that very (*tasyāśya*) [thing that has been taught], which serves the human goal, [and hence] is suitable to being practiced, is reliable, the assumption that this is so also in the case of the other, transcendent realm may not lead to one's deception. [And this is for two reasons:] 1) because there is no counter evidence (*anuparodha*), and 2) because it is pointless for a speaker to make false statements without a purpose.

2.6. Conclusion of this excursus on PS 2.5ab

What we have seen so far certainly does not substantiate my claim that for Dharmakīrti scripture is not a means of valid cognition. On the contrary, we learn that the statements of a credible person and inferences based on a scripture that has either been well checked or expounds the main religious teachings, are reliable even with regard to real states of affairs and not just the speaker's intention. Thus – to invert a common saying – what you get is what he has seen.

However, before refuting other ways of accounting for the reliability of credible persons offered by opposing schools (PV 1.218ff.), Dharmakīrti concludes his interpretation of Dignāga's definition with the following words:

tad etad agatyobhayathāpy anumānatvam āgamasyopavarṇitam – varam āgamāt pravṛttāv evaṃ pravṛttir iti. na khalv evam anumānam anapāyam, anāntarīyakatvād artheṣu śabdānām iti niveditam etat. PVSV 109,20–22

Thus, this scripture has been explained in both ways to be inference for want of [any other] possibility (*agatyā*), [having in mind:] "Given that one has to proceed on account of scripture it is still better (*varam*) to proceed in such a way." However, inference in such a way indeed is not without problems (*na ... anapāyam*), for words are not invariably concomitant with [their] objects. This [we already] have explained [in PV 1.213].

Here we learn, if my interpretation of *agatyā* is correct, that scripture can only be said to be *anumāna* (in the sense of an inferential mark [*liṅga*] or logical reason [*hetu*]), because there is no better way to define it and because it is still better to proceed on the basis of a checked

or “purified” *āgama* than just blind faith, e.g., in the Veda. But, in whichever way this definition is to be understood, to infer the reliability of a credible person’s statement with regard to transcendent matters is problematic. Thus, although Dignāga’s definition is in contradiction with Dharmakīrti’s theory that words are not connected to their objects, Dignāga nevertheless did the best he could under the circumstances that we require scripture to live our lives and, thus, ideally should rely on one that is optimally reliable. What kind of problem Dharmakīrti had in mind, when he says *na ... anapāyam*, he does not share with us here.

3. OTHER PV(SV) PASSAGES ON *ĀGAMA*

Alas, it is only much later that Dharmakīrti tells us specifically what kind of problem he had in mind. This kind of inference where one infers correctness with regard to transcendent matters from the correctness of statements in one part is a fallacious inference called a *śeṣavadanumāna*. Moreover, we know that Dignāga was aware of this type of fallacy, because in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* he refutes the *śeṣavadanumāna* of the Naiyāyikas. Dharmakīrti refers, without actually saying so, to PS 2.28b with *Vṛtti* where Dignāga refutes the Naiyāyikas using the same examples as Dharmakīrti. The main difference between these two kinds of *śeṣavadanumāna* applied by the opponent, in this case a Mīmāṃsaka, and by the Buddhist is that the Buddhist scripture is “purified” by an examination and thus it might sometimes be reliable. Thus, in this case the probability that it is true is greater, but there is no certainty.

But another [theorist], renouncing the definition of scripture as [that which is] authorless [because of a similar criticism, and] wishing to prove the authority of the Veda in another way, says, “[Those] Vedic sentences for which there is no cognition [on the part of Buddhists as being true] are [in fact] true, because they are part of the [same] Veda, just like the sentence ‘Fire is the remedy for cold,’ etc.” ...

... This kind of inference was declared to be not [really] a proof by the master [Dignāga] himself in pointing out the deviating character of the

Naiyāyikas' *śeṣavat*-inference [in PS(V) 2.28b],³⁹ like the [so-called] proof that fruit [one has not tasted] has the same taste [as fruit one has tasted] because it has the same colour, and the [so-called] proof that rice grains one has not observed are cooked, like those which one has observed, because they are in one [and the same] vessel. And the manner in which this [*śeṣavat*-inference] is not a proof has [already] been stated earlier [in PV 1.14 with PVSV]. And [true,] we have stated this definition of scripture [too]. However, this [is justified only] if, for every object capable of being examined, there is correctness (*viśuddhi*) of positive and negative assertions by appropriate means of valid cognition. [And] even if there is no necessary relation between words and [their] meanings [, which would ensure the validity of scripture], it is better that a [person] act in [a state of] doubt [when it comes to matters relating to worldly prosperity and salvation];⁴⁰ for [scripture] may occasionally be reliable in this case.⁴¹

Why there can be no certainty Dharmakīrti has already stated before, where he also referred back to the definition of scripture I have dealt with at the beginning of this paper and to his remark that such an inference is not without problems.

³⁹ PSV_K 115b2–4: *lhag ldan la yañ dpe byed na // (= PS 2.28b: śeṣavaty api ced vatih) lhag ma dañ ldan pa la yañ gal te dpe byed pa yin na / lhag mñon sum dañ mtshuñs pa'i yul gañ la yod pa de'i śes pa ni lhag ma dañ 'dra ba'o žes bya ba 'di yañ 'khrul pa'i phyir tshad ma ma yin te / gzugs mtshuñs pas ro la sogs pa gdon mi za bar mtshuñs par 'gyur ba ni ma yin no // de ltar na lhag ma dañ ldan pa la yañ dper mi rigs pa yin no //*. See above, p. 62 and n. 126.

⁴⁰ The idea that one acts in regard to transcendent objects from a state of doubt once the scripture is purified is also propounded by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla; see McClintock 2010: 322–324.

⁴¹ PVSV 173,16–174,1: *anyas tv apauruṣeyam āgamalakṣaṇam parityajyānyathā prā-mānyaṃ vedasya sādhyatukāmaḥ prāha – avitathāni vedavākyāni yatrāpratipattiḥ, vedaikadeśatvāt, yathāgnir himasya bheṣajam ityādi vākyam iti. ... svayam idrśam ācāryeṇānumānaṃ naiyāyikaśeṣavadanumānavyabhicāram udbhāvayatā tulyarū-patayā phalānām tulyarasasādhanavad ekasthālyantargamād dr̥ṣṭavad adr̥ṣṭataṇḍu-lapākasādhanavac cāsādhanam uktam. tadasādhanatvanyāyaś ca pūrvam evoktaḥ. uktaṃ cedam āgamalakṣaṇam asmābhiḥ. tat tu sarvasya śakyavicārasya viśayasya yathāsvaṃ pramāṇena vidhipratīṣedhaviśuddhau nāntarīyakatvābhāve 'pi śabdānām artheṣu varaṃ samśayitasya vṛttiḥ, tatra kadācid avisamvādasambhavāt...* On this passage, see above, pp. 62–64.

Objection: Isn't it the case that such a thing as the arrangement of the world, even though it is not an object [accessible] to reason, is known [by you Buddhists] from the statement of a person which must be assumed [to be true, on the basis of his reliability in regard to other things]? [Answer:] No, because [we have] no confidence [in such a person]. It is indeed not the case that, since [a person has been observed] not to err with respect to a certain [matter], everything [that person says] is like that [i.e. true, and this for two reasons: first, because one observes that [people who are known to be reliable in regard to a certain thing do in fact] err [in regard to other things]; and [second,] because a concomitance between the [verbal] activity of this [allegedly superior person] and reliability is not established. *Beyond that, the [aforementioned] definition of scripture has been accepted for lack of [any other] recourse. There is [indeed] no ascertainment [of supersensible things] from [scripture thus defined, and] this is the reason why [we have] also stated [above] that scripture is not a means of valid cognition.*⁴²

These inferences are mainly uncertain, because one cannot establish a pervasion between scripture and its reliability, and only such a pervasion could guarantee the certainty of the inference. Therefore, Dharmakīrti repeats that this definition was assumed only in want of a better possibility and that there is no certainty from scripture. And this is the reason why he also said that *āgama* is not a *pramāṇa*.

In the last chapter of his PV Dharmakīrti refers to these passages.

prāmāṇyam āgamānām ca prāg eva vinivāritam / PV 4.101ab

Now, it had already been refuted earlier that scriptures were *pramāṇas*. (Tillemans 2000: 141)

So far we have seen that by reading bits and pieces from different discussions of *āgama* in the PVSV together the impression that we gained from Dharmakīrti's interpretation of Dignāga's definition of scripture, namely that it is a real *pramāṇa* with regard to external objects such as

⁴² PVSV 167,23–168,2: *nanu kaścil lokasanniveśādir ayuktiviśayo 'pi sambhāvanīyapuruṣavacanād arthaḥ pratipadyate. na, apratyayāt. na hi kvacid askhalita iti sarvaṃ tathā, vyabhicāradarśanāt, tatpravṛtter avisamvādena vyāptyasiddheś ca. **agatyā cedam āgamalakṣaṇam iṣṭam. nāto niścayaḥ. tan na pramāṇam āgama ity apy uktam.*** On this passage, see also above, pp. 42–44. The passage beginning with *na hi kvacit* is also translated in Tillemans 1999a: 400; see also Kataoka 2011b: 256 n. 10.

heaven, has now changed and it has become clear that *āgama* is not a *pramāṇa* at all. It is only under certain circumstances, namely when it has been completely checked and purified, that there might be a chance of proceeding successfully based on *āgama*. Or else, when an *āgama* or *āptavāda* expounds the main teachings, as we have seen in PV 1.217 with PVSV. What Dharmakīrti formulates in PV 1.217 and his commentary thereon serves as a leitmotif for his second chapter entitled *Pramāṇasiddhi*, which is entirely devoted to the proof that the Buddha is *pramāṇa*.⁴³ But in order to avoid the mistake of employing a *śeṣavad-anumāna*, the Buddha is proved to be *pramāṇa* only metaphorically. Just as a *pramāṇa* qua cognition is not belying (*pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam* PV 2.1ab₁) and makes known a hitherto unknown object (*ajñātārthaprakāśo vā* PV 2.5c), in the same way the Buddha is not belying with regard to and makes known the Four Noble('s) Truths, which hitherto were unknown to us.⁴⁴

⁴³ PV 2.32 (cf. PV 1.217): *heyopādeyatattvasya sābhuyupāyasya* (: *hānyupāyasya* Miyasaka ed.) *vedakaḥ / yaḥ pramāṇam asāv iṣṭo na tu sarvasya vedakaḥ //*. “He who makes known the nature of what is to be obtained and what is to be avoided, together with their means, is assumed to be a *pramāṇa*, but not he who makes everything known.” PV 2.145–146ab: *tāyaḥ svadṛṣṭamārgoktir vaiphalyād vakti nānṛtam / dayālutvāt parārthañ ca sarvārambhābhīyogataḥ // tataḥ pramāṇam, tāyo vā catuḥsatyaprakāśanam /*. “‘Protection’ [i.e., causing people to cross,] is stating the path seen by himself. He does not tell a lie, (1) because it is pointless, (2) because he is compassionate, and (3) because he perseveres in all his undertakings for the sake of others. Therefore [he is] a *pramāṇa*. Or, protection is illuminating the four Noble('s) Truths.” On these one-and-a-half verses, see, e.g., Kataoka 2011b: 258–259 with n. 20.

⁴⁴ See Krasser 2001. It goes without saying that I do not agree with Franco who concludes his very learned chapter “The Framework and Proof-Strategy of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-Chapter” by comparing Dharmakīrti’s strategy with that of Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana. Dharmakīrti was well aware of the fact that Dignāga’s way of understanding *āgama* was similar to that of Pakṣilasvāmin and that both operated with a false *śeṣavadanumāna*, a mistake that Dharmakīrti avoided. Franco (1997: 39–40): “To conclude, I have tried to show that there are strong resemblances and parallels between Dharmakīrti’s proof of the validity of the Buddhist *āgama*, which is based on the Buddha’s being *pramāṇabhūta*, which is based in its turn on the establishment of the four noble truths, and Vātsyāyana’s proof of the validity of the Veda, which is based on its composition by *āptas*, whose status is based in its turn on the effectiveness of the statements of the Āyurveda, the *mantras*, etc. I would even go so far as to say that although structurally the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter is construed as a commentary on the five epithets of the Buddha, the interpretation of the

4. MORE ON PVSV 108,1–109,22

These two accounts of *āgama*, according to which, on the one hand, it cannot be counted as a *pramāṇa* at all and according to which, on the other, it yields correct knowledge even of external objects, seem completely incompatible to me. Yet we find them in the work of one and the same author. Thus, to which view did he really subscribe?

The depiction of scripture as having the special status as an inference, but an inference that is not without problems, leads Dunne to an interesting description of Dharmakīrti's approach to it.

A significant feature of this argument is the tension that it evidences between an appeal to one's own empirical knowledge as opposed to trusting in another's (i.e., the Buddha's) transempirical knowledge.... Nevertheless, despite this claim's empiricist tones, Dharmakīrti is apparently troubled by his own appeal to the Buddha's transempirical knowledge and concomitant extraordinary qualities. How else can we explain the fact that he immediately backpedals by denying that scriptural inference is really an inference at all (6)? Moreover, he then proceeds to reject explicitly any appeal to credibility (7). (Dunne 2004: 241f.)

Tillemans, on the other hand, who is well aware of the passages aduced above in §3, considers scripture as depicted in the PV(SV) 108,2–109,19 to be an "exception." In his summary of PV 1.216 he writes,

(d) v. 216: Dignāga's point in saying that authoritative words were an inference was that when an authority's words (= scripture) have been found to be non-belying on rationally decidable matters, then we are justified to understand radically inaccessible matters based on that scripture. In this particular case, contrary to what was said in v. 213, we do infer something more than just the speaker's intention from his words: we also infer that the state of affairs obtains. This one 'exception' to v. 213 must be allowed because otherwise there would be no way (*agatyā*) for us to come to know radically inaccessible things. (Tillemans 1999a: 399–400 = 1999b: 41–42)

epithets and the general strategy employed to prove the validity of the Buddhist teachings owe more to Vātsyāyana than to Dignāga." On Paṅśilasvāmin, see below, p. 110 n. 49.

And in his introduction to the same paper, which summarizes Dharmakīrti's position on *āgama*, we read,

It is well known that Dharmakīrti commented upon the phrase *āptavādā-visaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā* in Dignāga as showing that quotations from authorities could be used to prove certain propositions inferentially. In particular, use of scripture or scriptural tradition (*āgama*) was supposedly not a separate means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), but was said to be an inference because similar to other inferences in reliably representing its object, i.e. in 'not belying' (*avisaṃvāda*). This then is *āgamāśrītānumāna*, 'scripturally based inference'. Of course, not just any scripture can be used as a basis for such an inference, nor can such inferences pertain to any and all objects. The main criterion separating reliable from bogus scriptures is the threefold analysis whereby it is determined that ...

There follows a description of the threefold analysis. Then Tillemans goes on to say,

... Now, if the scripture passes this triple test, it is fit to be used in 'scripturally based inferences', but with the all-important stipulation that such inferences are only to be used in the case of radically inaccessible matters (*atyanta-parokṣa*), ones which are not in the domain of observation or objective reasoning, but are only accessible once we have accepted (*abhy-upagata*) scripture. In short, *āgamāśrītānumāna* works where objective inference and observation leave off. ... This interpretation of Dharmakīrti's account of scripturally based inferences, which we shall term for short 'inference-like-any-other', is not just a hypothetical possibility. (Tillemans 1999a: 395–396; not reprinted in 1999b)

The questions I want to address here are:

- Was Dharmakīrti "troubled by his own appeal to the Buddha's trans-empirical knowledge"?
- Does Dharmakīrti hold the position that this "one 'exception' to v. 213 must be allowed because otherwise there would be no way (*agatyā*) for us to come to know radically inaccessible things"?

- Is this “inference-like-any-other”⁴⁵ more than “just a hypothetical possibility” and can it “be used to prove certain propositions inferentially”?

Let me begin with the second question by examining the meaning of *agatyā*.

4.1. On *agatyā*

agatyā in the context of the *āgama* discussion has been used by Dharmakīrti three times: once in PV 1.216, once in PVSV 109,19, and once in PVSV 168,1. It has been translated variously as follows (the passages are given approximately in chronological order):⁴⁶

PV 1.216 (see above p. 88)

- “for [otherwise] there would be no way [to know such objects]” (Tillemans 1986: 32, 1990: I.25, 1993: 11; and similarly Dunne 2004: 364)
- “for there is no [other] possibility (*agatyā*) [to explain it]” (Yaita 1987: 8)
- “since there is no [other] possibility [but to also regard the latter kind of statement as an inference...]” (van Bijlert 1989: 124)
- “[... mais cela, Dignāga ne l’a dit qu’]en raison de l’impossibilité [où l’on se trouve sinon] d’accéder [aux objets radicalement imperceptibles]” (Eltschinger 2007a: 224)

PVSV 109,19: *tad etad agatyobhayathāpy anumānatvam āgamasyopavarṇitam, varam āgamāt pravṛttāv evaṃ pravṛttir iti*

- “Thus [the fact that] *āgama* is *anumāna* has been described in [different] two ways [in v.216 & 217], owing to impossibility [of explaining in any other manner the *āgama*’s authoritativeness, i.e. by considering our ordinary conception:] ‘When [some act] is going to be done, it

⁴⁵ If one accepts the account of *sāmānyāt* as proposed above in §2.4, then Tillemans’ expression “inference-like-any-other” for this kind of inference might not be the best choice.

⁴⁶ See also McClintock 2010: 259.

is certainly (*evam*) better to act on the basis of *āgama*’.” (Yaita 1987: 10)

- “This fact that scripture is an inference is asserted in both cases [i.e. in vv. 216 and 217] because of the lack of any [other] way. If one engages oneself on the basis of scripture, it is better to engage oneself in this fashion [on the basis of a correct scripture rather than on the basis of one which belies].” (Tillemans 1999a: 400)
- “[Mais de chacune] des deux manières [dont on l’a fait, ce n’est qu’]en raison de l’impossibilité d’accéder [sinon aux objets radicalement imperceptibles que nous avons] exposé le caractère inférentiel de l’Écriture, [jugeant] que tant qu’à agir à partir d’une Écriture, mieux vaut agir ainsi.” (Eltschinger 2007a: 227)
- “Thus, in both cases, that the scripture is a valid inference is explained because there is no [other] way.” (Kataoka 2011b: 256)⁴⁷

PVSV 168,1–2: *agatyā cedam āgamalakṣaṇam iṣṭam*

- “Now, we accept this defining character of scripture for lack of any [other] way.” (Tillemans 1999a: 400)
- “And this definition of scripture [as an inference] is accepted [by us] because there is no other way.” (Kataoka 2011b: 256 n. 10)

Of these possibilities I prefer the one according to which this definition was given or accepted for lack of any other way. I understand *agatyā* as referring back to the initial explanation I proposed in §2.1 of why Dignāga gave a definition at all, namely, because otherwise activity with regard to transcendent matters is not possible. Thus, he had no other choice than to give this definition, knowing that, though it is faulty, it is the best definition available. But he gave, of course, the best one that is possible. Thus, I prefer *agatyā* to be read with the past participles in these phrases: *agatyābhihitā* (k. 216), *agatyā ... upa-*

⁴⁷ Kataoka is of the opinion that *agatyā* should exclude such possibilities as the Buddha’s being a liar or his teaching having no aim and so forth, by relating it to the Mīmāṃsaka proof of Manu’s reliability.

varṇitam (PVSV 109,19–20), and *agatyā ... iṣṭam* (PVSV 168,1–2). This is also the approach taken by the commentators.⁴⁸

If we understand *agatyā* as “for [otherwise] there would be no way [to know such objects]” or something similar, then we would have to supply the phrase “knowledge of transcendent matters,” which, though implied in his explanation of k. 216 (*arthāvisaṃvādād anumānam* PVSV 109,11), Dharmakīrti tries to avoid. By introducing *agatyā*, understood in this way, Dharmakīrti is better able to down-play the obvious contradiction between his attitude towards scripture and Dignāga’s definition and to arrive at the “solution” that it is still better to act towards transcendent matters on account of doubt, for sometimes it might work (*tatra kadācid avisaṃvādasambhavāt*, cf. above n. 41). Moreover, in this way Dharmakīrti can avoid committing a *śeṣavadanumāna* himself.⁴⁹

I also do not follow Kataoka’s hypothesis, though it is tempting, that *agatyā* excludes such possibilities as the Buddha’s being a liar or his teaching having no aim and so forth. Here, the context is to explain away as much as possible the contradiction between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, not at all to prove that the Buddha is a *pramāṇa*.

Returning to the question under consideration, namely whether this “one ‘exception’ to v. 213 must be allowed because otherwise there would be no way (*agatyā*) for us to come to know radically inaccessible things” (Tillemans), I cannot see that scripture as defined by Dignāga in the way we have seen, so that it amounts to a *śeṣavadanumāna*, would

⁴⁸ See, e.g., Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin on PV 1.216. PVT Je D245b2/P289b8–290a1: *de yañ go skabs med de rnam pa gzan gyis śin tu lkog tu gyur pa la ’jug pa med pa’i phyr ro // ’jug pa yod na de ltar ’jug pa’o^a [D : ’jug par bya’o P] // ≈ PVSVT 393,30–394,8: sā cāgatyābhihitānyena prakāreṇāntyantaparokṣe pravṛtṭyasambhavāt, ^asatyāṃ pravṛttau varam evaṃ pravṛtta iti^a.*

^a cf. PVSV 108,5–6: *sati pravartitavye varam evaṃ pravṛtta iti*, and PVSV 109,20–21: *varam pravṛttāv āgamād evaṃ pravṛttir iti*.

⁴⁹ This kind of *śeṣavadanumāna* we find implied by Pakṣilasvāmin. NBh 97,2 on NSū 2.1.68: *teṣāṃ khalu vai prāṇabhṛtāṃ svayam anavabudhyamānānāṃ nānyad upadeśād avabodhakāraṇam asti*. “Now, when these [ordinary] living beings do not know for themselves [through their own power of cognition those things that should be avoided or obtained], then there is no other cause of [correct] knowledge [left for them] than the [valid] instruction [given by the expert speaker].” Translation van Bijlert 1989: 161.

constitute an exception to verbal knowledge for Dharmakīrti in guaranteeing knowledge of or access to external objects such as heaven.⁵⁰ It is only when it comes to religious practice that, acting on the basis of a purified scripture, the probability of success is higher, but there is no certainty at all.

Connected to this problem is also the question whether such an inference based on scripture is more than “just a hypothetical possibility” and whether it can “be used to prove certain propositions inferentially.”

4.2. On *āgamāpekṣānumāna*, *āgamāśraya-anumāna*

From the description by Tillemans cited above (pp. 106–107) we learn that “if the scripture passes this triple test, it is fit to be used in ‘scripturally based inferences,’” also called *āgamāśritānumāna*. If I am correct in assuming that what Tillemans means by *āgamāśritānumāna* is what Dharmakīrti calls *āgamāpekṣānumāna* (PVSV 109,1), *āgamāśrayam anumānam* (NB 3.114, PVin 3 128,4),⁵¹ or *āgamāpekṣam anumānam* (PV 4.48 = PVin 3.9; see Tillemans 2000: 78),⁵² then I must confess I have not been able to find any passage in Dharmakīrti, where he calls an inference based on a purified scripture that has passed the triple test a “scripturally based inference.” In PV 1 and PVSV Dharmakīrti uses scripturally based inferences only in the context of testing a scrip-

⁵⁰ As nicely shown by Tillemans (1993: Intro. §§ 2–4, 1999a: 396–399), later Tibetans such as Tsoñ kha pa or Śākya mchog ldan took such an inference based on scripture to be a full-fledged probative inference in which the *hetu* fulfils the *trairūpya* condition. See, e.g., Śākya mchog ldan’s account in the translation of Tillemans (1999a: 398 n. 5): “As for proving the [reason’s three] characteristics, the *pakṣadharmatā* is established by perception, for this reason is presented to an opponent who perceptually observes the statement, ‘From giving comes wealth and from morality, happiness’ [i.e. he sees that the statement is indeed present in the text of the *Ratnāvalī*]. As for the proof of the pervasion (*vyāpti*), there are the following two [subsections]: proving *anvaya* and proving *vyatireka*. We now take up the first [i.e. *anvaya*]. Take as the subject the *Ratnāvalī*; it is non-belying with regard to the propositions which it teaches, because it is a scripture [judged] immaculate through the three [kinds] of analysis.” For Indian forerunners, see Eltschinger 2007a: 107.

⁵¹ For the text and a translation of NB 3.114, see Tillemans 2000: 95 n. 336.

⁵² In PVin 2.42 this kind of inference is also referred to as *āgamārthāśrayā yuktiḥ*, see above, p. 55 n. 97.

ture. He does so when first explaining the triple test in his comments on PV 1.215.

āgamāpekṣānumāne 'pi, yathā rāgādirūpaṃ tatprabhavaṃ cādharmaṃ abhyupagamyā tatprahāṇāya snānāgnihotrāder anupadeśaḥ. PVSV 109,1–3

Also in the case of a scripturally based inference⁵³ [there should be no invalidation (*abādhana*). Non-validation is] as follows (*yathā*): Having accepted (*abhyupagamyā*) that demerit (*adharma*) consists in [defilements] such as desire (*rāgādirūpa*) and [the actions (*karman*)] born of them (*tat-*

⁵³ The text of Karṇakagomin (PVSVT 393,13–17) explaining the locative (*āgamāpekṣānumāne 'pi*) seems to be problematic: *yathātmādīnām (/) ādīśabdāt pradhāneśvarādīparigrahaḥ / na hy eṣāṃ kiñcil liṅgam asti yenānumeyāḥ syuḥ / etad api pratipādayiṣyati / viśuddhe viśayadvaye () 'tyantaparokṣe cāgamaviśaye paurvāparyavirodhena yasmin cintāṃ pravartayati tasminn āgamāpekṣam anumānam api / abādhanam iti prakṛtam / ātman, etc., in ātmādīnām* (PVSV 109,1) constitute examples of entities that should not be taught to be inferable in a treatise. By the word *ādī*, according to Karṇakagomin, primordial matter (*pradhāna*) of the Sāṅkhyas and a creator god (*īśvara*) are included, because there is no inferential mark on the basis of which they could be inferred. The problem now is, whether *viśuddhe viśayadvaye* should be read with *etad api pratipādayiṣyati* or with the next part beginning with *atyantaparokṣe*. The editor indicated *viśuddhe viśayadvaye* as an unidentified quotation and read it with *atyantaparokṣe*. In that case *viśuddhe viśayadvaye* has to be understood together with *atyantaparokṣe* as the object of the investigation by means of the scripturally based inference, as was done by Dunne (2004: 363 n. 9). Dunne, who also provides a translation of Śākyabuddhi's explanation, realized that this constitutes a problem and thus introduced his translation with the statement that Karṇakagomin "offers a somewhat less helpful comment." Thus, I propose to read *viśuddhe viśayadvaye* with *etad api pratipādayiṣyati* and to correct the text to *etad api pratipādayiṣyati – viśuddhe viśayadvaya iti* (or: *ityādīnā*). *viśuddhe viśayadvaye* would then be a reference to PV 4.50 where Dharmakīrti will explain that one can adduce passages from a scripture as inferential marks only after one has purified that scripture in terms of perceptible and empirically inferable objects according to the method explained in the comments on PV 1.214, but not before – this is the meaning of *viśuddhe viśayadvaye*, etc. (see Tillemans 2000: 80). And as the opponents can prove *ātman*, *pradhāna*, etc., only with the help of inferential marks (*liṅga*) that are taught in their treatises, they have no *liṅgas* available as long as their treatises have not passed the test. The treatises, however, will not pass the test as they teach *ātman*, *pradhāna*, etc., to be inferable without there being a *liṅga* available. Thus, Dharmakīrti in PV 4.50 will explain that there is no *liṅga* whatsoever, on account of which *ātman*, etc., could be inferred (*na hy eṣāṃ kiñcil liṅgam asti yenānumeyāḥ syuḥ. etad api pratipādayiṣyati*).

prabhava),⁵⁴ [a treatise] cannot prescribe [practices] such as the Agnihotra and ablutions (*snāna*) as means of eliminating it.

Later, this *abhyupagama* is presupposed in the comments on PV 1.333 (in the verse the formulation *āgamāpekṣeṇānumānena* is used).⁵⁵

anyad api pratyakṣānumānābhyāṃ^a prasiddhaviparyayam āgamāśrayeṇa cānumānena bādhitam agnihotrādeḥ pāpāśodhanasāmarthyādikam. PVSV 174,21–23⁵⁶

^a *prasiddha* em. (PVSVṬ 612,7) : *prasiddhi* PVSV : *pratisiddha* PVSV_{ms} 39b8.

[The Veda states] yet other [things] which are contrary to what is established by perception and inference and which are negated by inference based on scripture, such as the capacity of the Agnihotra and [ablutions] to purify one of sin, etc.⁵⁷

Thus, if I have not overlooked a passage in which Dharmakīrti uses the terms *āgamāśritānumāna*, *āgamāpekṣānumāna*, and the like for an inference that is based on a purified scripture, *āgamāpekṣānumana* for Dharmakīrti is not the same as the inference that is called by later Tibetans “inference based on authority” (*vid ches pa'i rjes dpag*, see Tillemans 1993: 12).

Coming back to the second and third questions posed above (see pp. 107–108), Is inference based on a purified scripture more than “just a hypothetical possibility,” as Tillemans alleges, and can it “be used to prove certain propositions inferentially”? I would answer “no” to both. For Dharmakīrti such an inference is a *śeṣavadānumāna*, and thus I cannot see how it should be more than “just a hypothetical possibility.” If such inferences nevertheless are used as in the Tibetan tradition, then the “certain propositions” that can be inferred based on a purified scripture would be any of the propositions of that scripture regarding transcendent matters. Once the scripture has been established to be

⁵⁴ Cf. PVSVṬ 393,19: *tatprabhavaṃ rāgādisamutthāpitaṃ kāyavākkarma cādhar-mam abhyupagamyā.*

⁵⁵ This *abhyupagama* is also presupposed in PV 4.107; see Tillemans 2000: 150–152.

⁵⁶ For Śākyabuddhi’s explanation, see above, pp. 69–70 n. 142.

⁵⁷ This *āgama* is attributed by Kamalaśīla to Kapila, the founder of the Sāṅkhya, and others; see McClintock 2010: 319–320.

purified by the triple test, then any statement of that scripture regarding transcendent matters has to be non-belying (*avisamvāda*), because it is a statement of that scripture. The logical reason is a *svabhāvahetu*, as in the inferences of Śākyabuddhi referred to above (p. 99), at least in the various passages discussed by Tillemans.

Now we can consider the first question posed above (see p. 107). Was Dharmakīrti “troubled by his own appeal to the Buddha’s transcendental knowledge”? As we have seen so far, Dharmakīrti has a clear concept of *āgama* and of Dignāga’s definition: *āgama* is not a *pramāṇa* and there can be no certainty from its statements regarding transcendent matters; Dignāga’s definition is faulty, constituting a *śeṣavadanumāna*. Thus, I think Dharmakīrti was not troubled by his own appeal to the Buddha’s transcendental knowledge, but he was troubled by Kumārila. For Dignāga’s definition came under fire in the *Ślokavārttika*, where Kumārila in the broader context of his refutation of omniscience has a section (*ŚV codanā* 121–132), which is titled “Denial of *ekadeśasaṃvādānumāna*” by Kataoka (2011a: 348). Already the introductory one-and-a-half verses make it clear that the argument at stake is the same as the one propounded by Dignāga in his definition of *āgama* in PS 2.5ab.

Even a man who (*yo 'pi*), after having seen [i.e., ascertained] (*drṣtvā*) a person to be reliable (*satyavāditām*) with regard to [perceptible] objects that have connections with the sense-faculties and so on (*indriyādisambandhaviṣaye*), supposes (*kalpayet*) [that a statement of that person must] also (*api*) [be true] with regard to an [imperceptible and religious] matter that one can only believe (*śraddheye 'rthe*), because it is a statement of the same person (*tadvacanatvena*), he too (*tenāpi*) would have proved (*sādhitā syāt*) validity (*pramāṇatā*) through dependence [on something external] (*pāratantryeṇa*).⁵⁸ (Kataoka 2011a: 348–354)

Although Kumārila refers to objects that are connected with the sense-faculties (*indriyādisambandhaviṣaye*), I think there is little risk in interpreting this as a reference to the objects of perception and empirical inference. This is at least the way Kumārila’s commentators under-

⁵⁸ ŚV *codanā* 121–122ab: *yo 'pīndriyārthasambandhaviṣaye satyavāditām / drṣtvā tadvacanatvena śraddheye 'rthe 'pi kalpayet // tenāpi pāratantryeṇa bādhitā syāt pramāṇatā /*.

stand it, alluding to the Buddha's teaching of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) as the basis for establishing that his teaching is (generally) true: Umbeka – *pramāṇāntaragocarārthapratipādake hi kṣaṇikādivākya*; Sucaritamīśra – *indriyādisambandhaviṣaye hi jñānamātrakṣaṇikatvāda*; Pārthasārathimīśra – *asmadādipramāṇagocarārthaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ sarvasaṃskṛtam ityādi buddhavākyam* (see Kataoka 2011a: 348–349 n. 374). This is exactly the example that is used by Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin when explaining PS 2.5ab as presented in PVSV 108,1 (*dper na 'dus byas thams cad ni skad cig ma zes bya ba la sogs pa lta bu'o //; yathā kṣaṇikāḥ sarve saṃskārā ityādikaḥ*; see above, n. 35). In the continuation of his argument Kumārila's tone becomes quite sarcastic as he shows what else one could prove by such an argument.

This statement of mine (*vaco mama*) “the Buddha, etc. (*buddhādīnām*) are not omniscient” (*asarvajñam iti*) is true, because it is stated by me (*maduktatvāt*), just like (*yathaiva*) [my statements] “fire is hot” (*agnir uṣṇaḥ*) and (*api*) “[fire is] bright” (*bhāsvara iti*).^{59, 60}

And (*ca*) it is a perceived fact (*pratyakṣam*) that I uttered (*maduktatvam*) [this sentence], whereas you have to prove (*tvayā sādhyā*) that he [i.e., the Buddha and so on] stated (*taduktatā*) [these teachings]. Therefore (*tena*) mine (*madīyaḥ*) should be (*syāt*) a [correct] reason (*hetuḥ*), whereas yours (*tava*) is not established because it is doubtful (*saṃdigdhāsiddhatā*).⁶¹ (Kataoka 2011a: 364)

I think that being faced with such mocking criticism and knowing that the back-bone of his own *apoha* theory is completely contrary to what Dignāga proposed with his *āgama* definition, it fits the context better if we assume Dharmakīrti to be troubled by Kumārila rather than by his own appeal to the Buddha's transempirical knowledge. Dharmakīrti could not but bite the bullet. And he did it quite skilfully.

⁵⁹ On the possibility of a Mīmāṃsaka using such a kind of *śeṣavadanumāna* to derive the validity of the Veda in all its parts from a statement such as “Fire is the remedy for cold,” see above pp. 102–103 with n. 41.

⁶⁰ ŚV *codanā* 130: *buddhādīnām asarvajñam iti satyaṃ vaco mama / maduktatvād yathaivāgnir uṣṇo bhāsvara ity api //*.

⁶¹ ŚV *codanā* 131: *pratyakṣam ca maduktatvam tvayā sādhyā taduktatā / tena hetur madīyaḥ syāt sandigdhāsiddhatā tava //*.

5. SUMMARY

Putting now together these various bits and pieces of information scattered throughout the PV(SV), we can sketch the following picture.

Being confronted with the fact that Dignāga's definition of *āgama* as well as the cognition that arises from it as an *anumāna* is not only faulty but also incompatible with his *apoha* theory, the only possibility left for Dharmakīrti was to resort to damage control. But he tried not only to minimize the damage as much as possible but also to benefit from it.

First of all, this definition of Dignāga is not to be understood on a logical level.⁶² It was presented by Dignāga only because humans like us cannot live without religion. This is due to the fact that credible persons report disastrous consequences of bad karma as well as the possibility of final release. Since we do not see anything that contradicts their reports, we are better off following their advice when we act. It is only under these circumstances that Dignāga gave this account;⁶³ being himself a specialist in logic (*nyāyavid*, PV 1.331), he knew very well that such a definition, logically speaking, is as deficient as the one proposed by the Naiyāyikas.⁶⁴ Thus, Dignāga set the standard for scripture as high as possible on a rational level – the entire body of *āgama* has to

⁶² PV 1.216 (*anumānatā ... agatyābhihitā*), see above, p. 88; PVSV 109,19–20 (*agatyā ... anumānatvam ... upavarṇitam*), see above, p. 101; and PVSV 168,1–2 (*agatyā cedam āgamalakṣaṇam iṣṭam*), see above, p. 104 n. 42. See also §4.1.

⁶³ PVSV 108,2–6; see above, p. 85 n. 11.

⁶⁴ PVSV 173,22–25 (on PV 1.331); see above, p. 103 n. 41. See also Tillemans 1999a: 401: “Kārṇakagomin and Śākyabuddhi ad v. 216 are clear on the implications: scriptural inference is an inference because of the thought of people (*pumso 'bhiprāyavaśāt*) who want to engage themselves (*pravṛttikāma*) on the spiritual path: it is not an inference objectively (*vastutas*).” Tillemans cites, in n. 11, Kārṇakagomin (PVSV 394,20–22): *kiṃ tarhiṣṭasya pratyakṣānumānāgamyayārthasyānantaroktena nyāyenāvisaṃvādād anumānam api pravṛttikāmasya puṃso 'bhiprāyavaśāt / vastutas tv ananumānam, śabdānām arthaiḥ saha sambandhābhāvāt /*. Already in their comments on *nāyam* (PVSV 108,2), etc., Śākyabuddhi and Kārṇakagomin had explained that Dignāga did not call *āgama* an inference in terms of real validity (*bhāvikaṃ prāmāṇyam*). PV 1.331: *'di skad du slob dpon gyis dños su tshad ma ñid du brjod pas luñ rjes su dpag pa ñid du gsuñs pa ni ma yin gyi / 'on kyañ skyes bu'i 'jug pa la ltos nas bstan pa yin no //* = PVSV 390,21–22: *nācāryeṇa bhāvikaṃ prāmāṇyam kathayatānumānatvam āgamasyoktam, api tu puruṣapravṛttim apekṣya*.

pass the triple test.⁶⁵ If it does, the probability that one will be successful in attaining one's religious goals is much higher.⁶⁶ But this triple test is not only helpful in religious matters, it also is an effective tool when dealing with the scriptures of the opposing schools. It is exactly this triple test that is consistently applied by Dharmakīrti throughout his works in order to refute the scriptures of his opponents; namely, they have to pass the test (1) in terms of perceptible objects, (2) in terms of objects that are inferable empirically, and then, finally, (3) in terms of internal contradictions which can be checked with the help of scripturally based inferences. And because *āgama* is not an independent *pramāṇa*, it cannot be used as long as it has not passed the first two steps of the triple test. Thus, many of the central doctrines of the scriptures of opposing schools, such as a permanent soul (*ātman*), primordial matter (*pradhāna/prakṛti*), or a creator god (*īśvara*), which in fact can only be proven by means of scripture (if at all), fail to pass the second step of the test, i.e., *ātman* and so on, which are taught to be inferable, in fact cannot be established by empirical inference.⁶⁷

The price for escaping Kumāri's critique, for keeping his theory that there is no relation between words and external objects as stated in PV(SV) 1.213 – one of the cornerstones in Dharmakīrti's refutation of the validity of the Veda – and for dragging down all scriptures to the realm where they can be tested by perception or empirical inference, was very high. Dharmakīrti had to abandon the validity of all scriptures, including that of the Buddhists. This is quite consistent with the rest of his logical system which builds on pervasion (*vyāpti*). There is no way whatsoever to establish a pervasion between the act of speaking of a credible person and his telling the truth.⁶⁸ In accordance with this theory Dharmakīrti established a different method to prove the authoritativeness of the Buddha in the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter, basing himself on empirical inference and thus avoiding a *śeṣavadanumāna*.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ PV 1.214–215 with PVS; see above §2.2.

⁶⁶ PVS 174,1: *tatra kadācid avisaṃvādasambhavāt*; see above, p. 103 n. 41.

⁶⁷ See PV 4.2 and 4.48–52 (especially 4.48 and 50) in Tillemans 2000: 11, 78–83; see also above, p. 112 n. 53.

⁶⁸ PVS 167,26–168,1: *tatpravṛtter avisaṃvādena vyāptyasiddheś ca*; see above, p. 104 n. 42.

⁶⁹ See above, pp. 105–106 and nn. 43 and 44.

While Dharmakīrti's courageous reform of Dignāga's theory of scripture, which he was forced to undertake not only by his own system but also by Kumāriḷa, turned out to be quite successful within the framework of his own system, it could very well have pleased Kumāriḷa and other non-Buddhists to see their worst critic giving up the validity of the *buddhavacana*. It was also very much welcomed by his Buddhist adversary Bhāviveka, who immediately sent his greetings:

*atrocyate pramāṇaṃ naḥ sarvaṃ tātḥāgataṃ vacaḥ /
 āptopadeśaprāmāṇyād bhadro hi pratipadyate //
 nāgamāntarasandigdḥaviparyastamatiḥ paraḥ /
 tasmāt tatpratipattiyarthaṃ tanmrgyo yuktimannayaḥ // MHK 5.8–9*

To this [*pūrvapakṣa* of the *Yogācāra*] we reply: All the words of the *Tathāgata* are authoritative (*pramāṇa*) for us, because the teachings of a reliable person are authoritative. A good one puts [these] into practice. The other one, whose mind is in doubt and confused by other scriptures, does not. Therefore the path of reasoning (*yuktimannaya*) should be followed by him in order to put these into practice.⁷⁰

And it might well be the case that Bhāviveka was not the only one to accuse Dharmakīrti of not being a good (*bhadra*) Buddhist by being taken in by Kumāriḷa's arguments against scripture, the arguments of the opponent (*āgamāntara*), and, in his confusion, thinking them to be his own arguments. There might have been other Buddhists as well who thought he had thrown the baby out with the bathwater.

⁷⁰ For the interpretation of these two verses and the commentary on the latter, see Section 1.3.1.1, "Who is the opponent in MHK 5.8–9?" in Krasser 2012: 545–546. For the text and different translations, see Hoornaert 2000: 78 and 90, and Eckel 2008: 225–227 and 394–395.